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THE REFERRAL FEE AND THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
SHOULD STATES ADOPT MODEL RULE
1.5(e)?
I. Introduction
The practice of fee splitting,' whether in the form of a referral,
forwarding or finder's fee, 2 between cooperating attorneys has long
been a part of the practice of law in this country.' Typically, a
referral fee situation occurs when an attorney (Attorney A) meets
with a client, and after some discussion advises the client to engage
the services of another attorney (Attorney B) whom he specifically
recommends.4 Attorney A then enters into an agreement with At-
torney B under which he is to receive some portion of the fee that
1. A division of fees has been defined as:
[A] single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers
who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association
of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve
the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent
and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist.
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SUMMARY REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
CONSIDER ADOPTION OF ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6 comment
4 (Aug. 7, 1985) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT]. A forwarding fee is "[t]he part
of the fee for handling a matter of legal business forwarded by one attorney to
another attorney to which the forwarder is entitled." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY
493 (3d ed. 1969).
2. For the purpose of this Note, the terms "referral fee," "forwarding fee"
and "finder's fee" are interchangeable.
3. See V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T.J. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN
SOCIETY 206 n. 1 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter COUNTRYMAN]; G. GREENWOOD & R.F.
FREDERICKSON, SPECIALIZATION IN THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS 137 (1964)
[hereinafter GREENWOOD]; see also R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGE-
MENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 59 (Federal Judicial Center 1980) [hereinafter
Aronson]; Hall & Levy, Intra-Attorney Fee Sharing Arrangements, 11 VAL. U.L.
REV. 1, 2 (1976) [hereinafter Hall & Levy]. For many years it was customary
within the legal profession for referred attorneys to pay a "finder's fee" or
"forwarding fee." GREENWOOD, supra, at 137.
4. See Webb, Referral Fees and the Effect of Disciplinary Rule 2-107, 8 J.
LEGAL PROF. 225 (1983) [hereinafter Webb].
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Attorney B collects. 5 Attorney A has no further contact with the
client or Attorney B in this matter. 6  As a result, a significant
amount of money paid by the client goes to a lawyer who arguably
has done very little work for the client.7
Few situations arise in which the client brings a complaint about
this practice to the court or to the bar.' The problems concerning
referral fees generally arise either when Attorney A anticipates a
referral fee even though he has never discussed it with Attorney B,
or when a fee has been discussed, but Attorney B has refused to
pay it.9 Historically, courts have been unwilling to enforce referral
fee agreements 10 unless Attorney A has indeed contributed more
services to the case or the two attorneys have made an express
contract between themselves." The primary reason espoused for this
refusal is that enforcement of such arrangements is generally against
public policy 2 and specifically violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code). 3 Disciplinary Rule 2-107 (DR 2-107) of the
5. See GREENWOOD, supra note 3, at 137 (stating that customary forwarding
fee is one-third of fee earned). The client ultimately executes an agreement with
the referred attorney for his services as well as with the first attorney. See Webb,
supra note 4, at 225.
6. For'a discussion of the typical referral fee situation, see J. CARLIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS 200 (1966) [hereinafter CARLIN].
7. The typical referral fee agreement occurs in tort cases. Forwarding lawyers
customarily send their cases to tort specialists and receive a fee based on a percentage
agreement regardless of each lawyer's comparative efforts and cost disbursements.
See Halstrom, Referral Fees are a Necessary Evil, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (Feb. 1985)
[hereinafter Halstrom]; see also Webb, supra note 4, at 226.
8. See Note, Attorneys: The Referral Fee: A Split in Opinion, 33 OKLA. L.
REV. 628, 629 (1980) [hereinafter The Referral Fee]; The Great Debate, 49 TEX.
B.J. 896, 897 (Sept. 1986). See cases and opinions cited in text.
9. See The Referral Fee, supra note 8, at 629.
10. See Webb, supra note 4, at 227.
11. See, e.g., Oberman v. Reilly, 66 A.D.2d 686, 411 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1st Dep't
1978); Jontow v. Jontow, 34 A.D.2d 744, 310 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't 1970);
Sterling v. Miller, 2 A.D.2d 900, 157 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd, 3
N.Y.2d 778, 143 N.E.2d 789, 164 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1957); see also R. SPEISER, AT-
TORNEYS' FEES § 6:3, at 243-44 (1973) [hereinafter SPEISER]; Hall & Levy, supra
note 3, at 5.
12. See SPEISER, supra note 11, § 6:3, at 244. See generally Note, The Deter-
mination of Professional Fees From the Ethical Viewpoint-A Panel Discussion,
7 U. FLA. L. REV. 433 (1954) [hereinafter The Determination of Professional Fees].
"The lawyer is not supposed to get paid for anything but the legal services that
he renders, and selling a man a client is not a legal service .... [lit is beneath
the dignity of the profession to take money for something that is not a legal
service." Id. at 434.
13. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (1977) (court refused to
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Code' 4 essentially states that if a lawyer is not going to put some
effort into and take some responsibility for a case, then he should
not receive any compensation. 5
In 1983, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a set of
rules substantially different from that of the Code. The new rules
are known as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules
or MR) and the ABA has offered them to the states for consideration
and adoption. 6 Section 1.5(e) of the Model Rules, unlike DR 2-107
of the Code, permits a division of fees without regard to the services
rendered by each lawyer, if both lawyers assume joint responsibility
for the representation, the client consents to the arrangement, and
the total fee is reasonable. 7
Nineteen of the fifty states have already adopted Model Rule 1.5(e)
with little or no modification."8 The provision, as part of the Model
approve fee based upon percentage agreement because the division of fees violated
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-107), vacated, 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978).
See generally Aronson, supra note 3, at 59-77.
14. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1969). New
York adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970. See N.Y.S.B.A.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (McKinney 1970).
15. See id,
16. The new Model Rules were drafted by the ABA Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards. This Commission consisted of lawyers, non-lawyers,
critics, and established members of the organized Bar. See Stark, Review Essay,
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 12 CONN. L. REV. 948, 950 n.12 (1980);
see also Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
66 A.B.A. J. 1074, 1075 (Sept. 1980) (it is intended that Model Rules be adopted
by legislatures and courts); Kutak, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
A Report to the Bar, 68 A.B.A. J. 1019, 1023 (Aug. 1982) (A.B.A.'s adoption
of Model Rules is invitation to bar-governing bodies to do same) [hereinafter
Kutak].
17. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983).
18. Thirteen states have adopted Rule 1.5(e) of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct without modification. See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 1.5(e)
(amended Sept. 7, 1984); ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.5(e) (adopting In re Ark. Bar Ass'n Petition for the Adoption of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, No. 83-187, slip op. (Ark. filed Dec. 16, 1985));
FLA. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (adopting The Florida
Bar Rules In re Rule Regulating the Bar, Nos. 65-197, 65-877, 67-085, 68-293 (Fla.
filed July 17, 1986)); MONTANA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.5(e) (adopting In re Adoption of the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, No. 84-303 (Mont. filed June 6, 1985)); NEW MEXICO RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (adopting In re Adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Specialization Plan (N.M. filed June 26, 1986)).
All of the above cases and statutes are reprinted in the National Reporter on Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility. See generally NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL
19871
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Rules, is now pending before several other states.' 9 In April of 1987,
New York adopted Model Rule 1.5(e).20 This adoption is significant
in that it represents the endorsement by a leading legal community
of a rule frequently criticized as tarnishing the practice of law. This
Note analyzes both the change in New York and the alternative
views with respect to fee referral arrangements in order to ascertain
whether the Code Rule, the Model Rule, or some variation of one
of them is preferable. 2'
Initially, this Note examines the history behind DR 2-107 and the
reasons for the ABA's adoption of Model Rule 1.5(e). 22 It then
analyzes DR 2-107 in depth to determine whether it has been effective
in terms of advancing the policies and purposes it was designed to
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1987).
Eight other states have adopted the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
so recently that to date, opinions have not been filed with these states' highest
courts. The relevant sections of the Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina Model Rules of Professional Conduct
are reprinted in the National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility. See id.
Six states have adopted Rule 1.5(e) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in amended form. See MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e)
(adopting No. C8-84-1650 (Minn. filed June 13, 1985)); NEV. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (adopting In re Repeal of Supreme Court Rules 163 through
204 and Adoption of Rules 150-203.5 (Nev. filed Jan. 27, 1986)); WASH. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (adopting Rules of Professional
Conduct, 104 Wash. 2d 1102 (1985)). All of the above cases and statutes are
reprinted in the National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
See generally NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY (1987).
Three other states have adopted amended forms of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct so recently that to date, opinions have not been filed with
the respective highest state courts. The relevant sections of the Connecticut, New
Hampshire and Virginia Model Rules of Professional Conduct are reprinted in the
National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility. See id.
19. Mississippi and Ohio have recommended adoption of Model Rule 1.5(e) of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct without modification. See generally
Memorandum from Amy Weber, Staff Assistant to Special Committee on Imple-
mentation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Nov. 11, 1986). The District
of Columbia and Illinois have recommended adoption of Model Rule 1.5(e) of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in amended form. See id.
Model Rule 1.5(e) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct is currently
pending before the Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wisconsin Supreme Courts
in amended forms, see id., and before the Indiana, the District of Columbia
(voluntary bar), Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, South Carolina, Utah and West
Virginia Supreme Courts without modification. See id.
20. See supra note 18.
21. See infra notes 47-137 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XV
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promote.23 The Note concludes that DR 2-107 is deficient for the
following reasons: (1) members of the legal profession oppose and
flagrantly violate the rule 24; (2) except in a few jurisdictions, violators
of the rule are rarely prosecuted 25 while even in those jurisdictions
that do enforce the rule, the courts are vague in their interpretation
of what the rule really prohibits; 26 and (3) the rule ignores current
business realities. 27 In addition, this Note analyzes the Model Rule
and concludes that the Model Rule ameliorates the shortcomings of
the Code Rule. 28 Finally, based on this analysis, this Note recom-
mends that other states follow New York's lead and adopt Model
Rule 1.5(e) or at least a version of it that is substantially the same. 29
II. History of DR 2-107 and MR 1.5(e)
Both DR 2-107 and MR 1.5(e) have their genesis in Canon 34 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics adopted in 1928. 30 Canon
34 in its original form provided in relevant part:
No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility . . . .'
The ABA originally drafted the Canon to ban the customary for-
warding fee among lawyers when the main responsibility as-
sumed by the referring attorney was merely the recommendation
of another lawyer. 2 As the practice of law became more com-
23. See infra notes 47-100 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 55-91 and accompanying text.
26. See id.
27. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 101-37 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
30. See Richardson, Division of Fees Between Attorneys, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 179,
185 (1978) (discussing history of both rules) [hereinafter Richardson]; Hall & Levy,
supra note 3, at 4 (discussion of history of Canon 34); see also Cady, Canons to
the Code of Professional Responsibility, 2 CONN. L. REV. 222 (1969) (discussion
of history of DR 2-107) [hereinafter Cady].
31. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 34 (1928) (as adopted by American
Bar Association House of Delegates) (emphasis added). In 1937, the Canon was
amended to eliminate a provision excepting commercial claims and divisions of fees
between attorneys and laymen. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 34
(1937) (as adopted by American Bar Association House of Delegates). Those
amendments are outside the scope of this Note.
32. See W.M. TRUMBELL, MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
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plex,33 however, the Canons of the ABA in general and Canon 34
in particular became "increasingly inadequate" as a standard of pro-
fessional responsibility.3 ' The Canon was vague, especially with regard
to the means by which an ethics committee, when evaluating a divi-
sion of fees, could measure services performed or responsibility as-
sumed.35
In an attempt to rectify this vagueness, the ABA adopted DR 2-
107, intending that it would be a stricter and better defined alternative
to Canon 34.36 DR 2-107 provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another
lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or
law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after
a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made, and
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed
and responsibility assumed by each, and
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.17
DR 2-107 now provided the safeguards of client consent to the
division of fees, the requirement of performing services, the as-
sumption of responsibility and the insurance that the fee charged
to the client would be reasonable. 3 Although the rule was still
unclear as to the definition of "services performed and responsibility
assumed," the ABA envisioned that this stricter rule requiring both
SIBILITY 287 (1957) (citing H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 186-88 (1953)) (discussion
of Canon 34 and the intentions behind its adoption).
33. See Cady, supra note 30, at 236. The legal profession now includes large
and small firms, corporate legal departments, and government lawyers. The legal
profession is not simply the solo practitioner. See generally GREENWOOD, supra
note 3; see also Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REv. 255, 265 (1970) [hereinafter
Sutton].
34. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives,
24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1970) [hereinafter Wright].
35. See id. at 6.
36. See Sutton, supra note 33, at 264. The Code was needed to give fair and
complete notice of forbidden conduct. The Committee's effort was devoted to
finding a suitable expression for standards and putting that expression in specific
form. See Wright, supra note 34, at 17-18 (Code in general was considered substantial
improvement over former canons; guidance given by Code was intended to be more
complete and more structured than most canons); see also Palmer v. Breyfogle,
217 Kan. 128, 141, 535 P.2d 955, 965 (1975).
37. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1969) (emphasis
added).
38. See id.
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services and responsibility as a joint entity would provide an ethics
committee with a clearer standard for evaluating violations of the
rule and in the long run would eliminate the custom of receiving
fees for little or no work. 9 The ABA also hoped that the rule would
solve the common problem lawyers often faced: choosing between
the attorney who offered the highest fee and the attorney who would
best protect the client's welfare. 40
Problems with the Code emerged, however, when the ABA realized
that a provision prohibiting such a customary practice was neither
realistic nor in keeping with the realities of the legal community. 41
Lawyers constantly-albeit covertly-violated the rule 2 and, as a
result, effectively defeated the intentions and goals behind the draft-
ing of the Code Rule. In 1983, the ABA, recognizing the futility
of such a strict prohibition, adopted Model Rule 1.5(e), which in
effect reinstated the liberal Canon 34 while retaining the safeguard
provisions (client consent and reasonable fee) of DR 1-207.43 This
rule provides:
1.5(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same
firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer
assumes joint responsiblity for the representation; and
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation
of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable. 4
In effect, the Model Rule allows referral fees by making the per-
formance of services an alternative to the assumption of responsibility
instead of an addition to this assumption as stated in the Code
39. Aronson, supra note 3, at 61 (stating that "Disciplinary Rule 2-107 (A)
... was adopted to clarify and to elaborate Canon 34").
40. See id. at 65.
41. Telephone interview with George A. Kuhlman, Special Counsel, ABA Center
for Professional Responsibility (Jan. 29, 1987).
42. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
43. "A.B.A. Model Rule 1.5(e) .... reinstates the principle of Canon 34 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics . . . ." AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION COMMITTEE
ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 57 (1st ed. 1985). See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these safeguards.
44. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Model Rule 1.5(e) (1983)
(emphasis added).
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Rule.45 The substitution of the word "or" in the Model Rule for
"and" as provided in the Code Rule4 6 makes Model Rule 1.5(e)
more flexible than DR 2-107. As is discussed below, the new rule
has proved to be the appropriate middle ground between the Canon
and Code rules.
III. Inadequacies of DR 2-107
One of the major difficulties with the Code Rule as it now stands
is that it does "very little good." '47 If the purpose of the rule is to
lessen the number of paid referrals between attorneys, then surely
the rule has not achieved its intended purpose. 4 Members of the
legal profession oppose and flagrantly violate the rule.4 9 Attorneys
do not use the rule as a self-policing mechanism. 0 Indeed, one study
found that "[tihe so-called forwarding fee of 33-1/3 percent has...
come to have been observed by the Bar as an accepted practice." 51
Another study determined that at least sixty-seven percent of the
lawyers surveyed said they would accept a referral fee. 2 And, in a
recent poll, a majority of the legal profession clearly favored referral
fees. 3 A rule thus "provoking such disrespect should be reexamined
[and revised] to determine whether its value is sufficient to overcome
the disadvantages of its unpopularity. ' '54
45. Compare ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Model Rule 1.5(e)
(1983) with ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1969).
46. See id.
47. See The Referral Fee, supra note 8, at 633.
48. See id. at 634.
49. See ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE, ETHICS AND AD-
VOCACY FINAL REPORT 17 (June 1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
50. See id.
51. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Stand-
ards, 37 VA. L. REV. 399, 416-17 (1951) [hereinafter McCracken]. The author sent
a questionnaire to one or more representative lawyers in forty-eight states. See id.
at 399.
52. See CARLIN, supra note 6, at 200.
53. See Law Poll, Forwarding Fees Are Fine With Most Lawyers, 71 A.B.A.
J. 48 (Feb. 1985). A majority of the lawyers (6201o) surveyed approved of the
practice of charging a referral or forwarding fee when sending a case to another
lawyer-so long as the client was fully informed and the total fee was reasonable.
See id. These conditions are very similar to Model Rule 1.5(e). See ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Model Rule 1.5(e) (1983).
54. Richardson, supra note 30, at 192. It is not suggested that all laws that
attorneys find undesirable and frequently violate should be amended to suit their
subjective preferences. The additional problem caused by courts ignoring the rule
as well as the problem caused by lawyers violating the rule, however, may necessitate
changing the rule to conform to the realities of legal practice.
[Vol. XV
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Along with the problem of attorneys refusing to follow and enforce
the rule is the problem of how courts have dealt with the Code
provision in ethical and substantive opinions.5 The confusion is
concentrated around the interpretation of DR 2-107(A)(2), which
requires a division of both services and responsibility between each
attorney.16 Part of this confusion stems from the inability and refusal
of courts to set forth a standard for determining what constitutes
a "proportionate" amount of services,5 7 or at least how much service
is necessary to justify a division of fees without giving the appearance
of condoning a referral fee." The remaining confusion stems from
the refusal to define the meaning of "responsibility" to give attorneys
some standard they can follow when attempting to refer cases.5 9
With regard to the division of services, the ABA (before its
adoption of the Model Rules) shunned any type of in-depth inquiry
into the apportionment of fees between two lawyers. 6° Its opinions,
in fact, made no effort at assigning a quantitative value to the
services performed by a lawyer. 61 Thus, by failing to set guidelines
on the amount of "services" necessary to conform to the rule, the
ABA on the one hand was condemning a practice (being paid for
no services) it considered unethical, while on the other hand it was
unwilling to advise attorneys on how they could avoid this unethical
practice. In one sentence the ABA stated: "Where an attorney
merely brings about the employment of another attorney but renders
no service and assumes no responsibility in the matter, the division
of fees is improper, ' 62 while in the next sentence it said: "[mleasuring
the relative division of service and responsibility between associate
55. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
56. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBMILITY DR 2-107 (1969).
57. See infra notes 60-91 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 60-91 and accompanying text; see also Kutak, supra note
16, at 1020. The enforcement of disciplinary regulations can be accomplished only
with the existence of clear, workable rules. See id.
60. See Webb, supra note 4, at 226; Hall & Levy, supra note 3, at 17. For
purposes of this Note, opinions concerning Canon 34 and DR 2-107 will be treated
similarly.
61. See Webb, supra note 4, at 226; see also ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 932 (1966) (opinion fails to quantify division of services);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 391 (1960) (same); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 204 (1940) (same).
62. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 204 (1940);
see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 932 (1966); ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 936 (1966).
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attorneys is not within the province of this ethics committee unless
the resulting fee to the client is flagrantly excessive." ' 63 Such a
response set a standard allowing for only the broadest interpretation
of the terms "services" and "responsibility. '"6 In effect, these words
became a synonym for "no service and no responsibility, ' 65 thus
prompting the many violations of the Code.
With respect to state court and substantive law definitions of
responsibility, two opinions are significant for their stance on referral
fees. 66 These cases are important not only for their policy views on
referral fees but also because they represent the first major effort
by state appellate courts to weigh relative participation and respon-
sibility in the handling of a legal matter. First, the court in McFarland
v. George 7 held that when an attorney merely refers or recommends
a legal matter to another lawyer and has performed no services and
assumed no responsibility in the case, a court should not permit a
division of attorney's fees. 68 The action in McFarland involved a
will contest in which the plaintiff, an attorney, referred his client
to the defendant, also an attorney, because the plaintiff was running
for public office at the time and could not give the case the time
and attention it needed. 69 The plaintiff took very little interest in
the case other than inquiring about its progress from time to
time.70 The defendant was successful in settling the suit and received
a court-approved fee of twenty thousand dollars.71 The lower court
had originally granted the plaintiff a portion of the fee based on
the idea that the two attorneys were involved in a joint venture,
but on appeal the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that holding. 72
63. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 204 (1940).
64. See Hall & Levy, supra note 3, at 12-13.
65. "[The lack of concrete guidance provided by the Committee remains clas-
sifiable as ... [a] 'cop-out'." Id. at 13. The Committee seemed to indicate that
to justify a division of fees a referring attorney might rely on some vague, if not
contrived, "responsibility." In other words, the mere selection and retention of
another lawyer justified a disproportionate sharing in the resultant fee-thus the
synonym of "no services" and "no responsibility." Id.
66. To date, the Supreme Court has made no ruling on what constitutes a
proper standard for the receipt of a referral fee.
67. 316 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (although Canon 34 is discussed, for
present purposes the decision may be read as analyzing DR 2-107).
68. See id. at 674.
69. See id. at 664.
70. See id. at 664-68.
71. See id. at 665.
72. See id. at 664.
[Vol. XV
REFERRAL FEES
The court reasoned that the referring attorney had to perform some
service or assume some responsibility to justify his fee. 73
Furthermore, in construing Missouri Rule 4.34 (the equivalent of
DR 2-107), the court held that "the service and responsibility referred
to in the rule ... must relate to an actual participation in or
handling of the case." ' 74 Specifically, the court stated that it found
little difficulty dealing with the meaning of the word "service," and
defined "responsibility" as "the doing of something. ' 75 Although
the opinion was a forceful attempt at defining the rule, the Missouri
court never specified in detail the actual meaning of the term "service."
Moreover, as an explanation for responsibility, "the doing of some-
thing" was equally vague. Thus, like the older ABA opinions, the
Missouri court in theory condemned the use of referral fees, but in
reality, refused to set a clear standard for the legal community to
follow in the future. Indeed, commentators have noted that much
of the material discussed in McFarland can be viewed only as dicta 76
because no procedure was established "to assess the relative pro-
portionate contributions of cooperating attorneys where a later dis-
pute arises concerning the right to share in a fee." ' 77
The other prominent case in terms of state law is Palmer v.
Breyfogle.7 1 In Palmer, the suit was between two attorneys, one of
whom wanted to recover one-third of a fee awarded in a divorce
case. 79 The plaintiff sued the defendant law firm for part of the
fee on the ground that in referring his client to the defendant and
in "keeping her happy" by providing friendship and support through-
out the case, he had performed services within the meaning of DR
2-107.0 In finding for the defendant, the Kansas Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiff had assumed no responsibility for the case
or performed any legal services meriting a portion of the fee.' This
court's definition of the terms "services" and "responsibility" re-
quired°"an actual participation in or the handling of the case." 2
73. See id. at 670.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 671.
76. See, e.g., Hall & Levy, supra note 3, at 10.
77. Id.
78. 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975).
79. Id. at 129, 535 P.2d at 958.
.80. Id. at 132-36, 535 P.2d at 961-69.
81. Id. at 147, 535 P.2d at 969.
82. Id.
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Although Palmer was more emphatic than McFarland in rejecting
a division of fees for minimal or no work done and no responsibility
assumed, it still left the standard for a proper division of fees vague.
The idea that "services" must be an act of participation in the case
is clear, but again, the idea of "responsibility" in that same definition
is uncertain and abstract. Once again, the importance of this court's
holding in terms of its policy view toward the referral fee is diluted
because of the vague guidelines it sets for the legal profession.
In addition to the difficulty the ABA and the Kansas and Missouri
state courts have had in defining service and responsibility, New
York courts, before adoption of Model Rule 1.5(e), had also paid
only lip service to DR 2-107.83 The courts usually found for the
referring attorney but based their holdings on standards different
from those of "service" and "responsibility." When the referring
attorney had performed no apparent services and had assumed no
responsibility, the courts allowed the referral fee arrangement while
camouflaging the reasoning for this allowance in the finding of a
"joint venture" or "partnership agreement '8 4 between the cooper-
ating attorneys.85 In Bohm v. Holzberg16 for example, the court
held that two lawyers handling the same case would be treated as
"special partners" if there was some division of services and re-
sponsibility and the party seeking to enforce the agreement actually
83. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
84. Lawyers between whom no general partnership exists may sometimes be
regarded as "joint venturers" or "special partners" for the particular transaction
when they jointly undertake to represent a client in a case. See Underwood v.
Overstrat, 188 Ky. 562, 223 S.W. 152 (1920); McCann v. Todd, 203 La. 631, 14
So. 2d 469 (1943); Daspit v. Sinclair Refining Co., 199 La. 441, 6 So. 2d 341
(1942); see also Annotation, Division of Compensation Between Attorneys Who
Co-operate in Legal Services, 10 A.L.R. 1352 (1920). For more discussion on joint
partners, see SPEISER, supra note 11, §§ 6.12, 6.13.
85. See Webb, supra note 4, at 227-28. "In the absence of agreement between
the attorneys express or implied by custom, on how fees will be divided, several
courts have applied the general rule of joint undertakings and allowed the attorneys
equal shares, regardless of disparities in labor or skill provided." COUNTRYMAN,
supra note 3, at 207; see Orenstein v. Albert, 39 Misc. 2d 1093, 242 N.Y.S.2d
505 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1963) (application of joint venture rationale),
aff'd, 20 A.D.2d 720, 247 N.Y.S.2d 563 (2d Dep't 1964); see also Sterling v.
Miller, 2 A.D.2d 900, 157 N.Y.S.2d 145 (2d Dep't 1956) (enforcement of contracts
for unequal sharing of fees without reference to proportionate sharing of services
or responsibility), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 778, 143 N.E.2d 789, 164 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1957);
In re Allen St., 148 Misc. 488, 266 N.Y.S. 277 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933)
(same).
86. 69 Misc. 2d 469, 329 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1st Dep't 1972).
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performed substantial services.8 7 Here, the court allowed enforcement
of an agreement for an equal division of the fee even though one
of the attorneys had done at least eighty percent of the work.88 The
Bohm court is thus typical of those state courts, which continue to
condemn the forwarding fee in theory, but in practice permit it
through various justifications.8 9 Moreover, like the ABA, 9° New York
courts made no attempt to evaluate legal services "proportionately"
rendered by referring attorneys or to define responsibility under DR
2-107. 91
The third major problem with DR 2-107 is that it is not syn-
chronized with the current business realities of the legal profession. 92
As one ethics committee noted, the Code "is out of date as compared
to current practice." 93 The legal profession has become so specialized94
that it is now impractical for any lawyer to keep all the cases that
come to him. 95 Yet most lawyers, at least most small general prac-
titioners, 96 will keep a case they are unqualified to handle 'if they
87. See id. at 470, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
88. See id.
89. See supra note 85. Some states expressly permit the payment of referral
fees to lawyers who forward cases even if they provide no other services and assume
no responsibility for the representation. See Moran v. Harris, 131 Cal. App. 3d
913, 922, 182 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (1982) (court upheld fee-splitting agreement
between referring attorney and lawyer who rendered legal services). The court ruled
that referral fee agreements were not then contrary to public policy, nor were they
contrary to public policy before enactment of the rule prohibiting them. See id.
at 920, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 523; see also Kuhn, Collins & Rash v. Reynolds, 614
S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (referring to DR 2-107 of Texas Code of
Professional Responsibility, expressly permitting referral fees). One court has even
held that a fee-splitting contract between lawyers cannot be deemed unenforceable
merely because it violates the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Model Code. See
Foote v. Shapiro, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 574 (C.P. Lehigh County 1978). In upholding
the contract, the court reasoned that when two attorneys have entered into an
unethical agreement for fees, one of them may not assert that fact against the
other to avoid the agreement. Id. at 580.
90. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
91. See Hall & Levy, supra note 3, at 8.
92. Telephone interview with George A. Kuhlman, Special Counsel, ABA Center
for Professional Responsibility (Jan. 29, 1987); see McCracken, supra note 51, at
400 (DR 2-107 is not "considered realistic and applicable to business and professional
conditions of the modern world").
93. See N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
94. See generally GREENWOOD, supra note 3, at 49-51.
95. See id.
96. See L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 276 (1971)
(small practitioners make up 1/2 of the bar) [hereinafter PATTERSON & CHEATHAM];
AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SPECIALIZATION, LEGAL SPE-
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cannot receive a fee for referring it. 91 Disciplinary Rule 6-101 of
the Code specifically states that a lawyer shall not take on a case
that he is incompetent to perform. 9s Nevertheless, unlike a large law
firm that can refer cases to other associates or partners, a small
practitioner with no associate will be tempted to handle a case
incompetently rather than refer it to a more qualified attorney who
would keep the entire fee. 99 This practice often results in a lesser
recovery than the client could have received had his attorney referred
the case to a more qualified attorney.1°0
IV. Advantages of Model Rule 1.5(e)
The new and more flexible Model Rule 1.5(e) resolves the problems
of the Code provision by giving attorneys a rule with which they
can comply and the courts a provision they can more easily enforce.' 0'
The Model Rule addresses the problem of defining "services" and
"responsibility," by stating that the performance of services is an
alternative to an assumption of responsibility. 0 2 This rule is different
from DR 2-107 which makes the performance of services an addition
to the assumption of responsibility.0 3 Such a difference makes de-
CIALIZATION 222 (1976) (statement of Henry Wright III) ("those men who practice
alone or in association with two or three others ... represent about 75 to 80
percent of the practicing Bar").
97. See SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
98. Disciplinary Rule 6-101 states, in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer shall not (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or
should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating
with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1969).
99. The Referral Fee, supra note 8, at 633.
100. See id.; FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 18.
101. "The new model rule enlarges the opportunity for the referring lawyer to
earn a referral fee while assuring that the referred client derives some benefit for
the payment beyond the referring lawyer's mere release of a matter that cannot
or will not be undertaken." Franck, No Referral Fee For No Work, 71 A.B.A.
J. 40, 44 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter Franck).
102. Model Rule 1.5(e)(1) provides that "the division is in proportion to the
services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation .... " A.B.A. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Model Rule 1.5(e) (1983) (emphasis added); see
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 85-1514 (1985)
[hereinafter Informal Op. 85-15141 (discussing use of preferred stock dividends or
limited partner distribution as vehicle for division of fees; although these devices
were impermissible under facts of case, Committee's discussion of Rules and Code
provisions is helpful).
103. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1969).
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fining "services" and "responsibility" easier because the two ideas
are no longer thrown together into one concept. With this division,
courts can analyze the performance of services and the assumption
of responsibility individually according to the facts of each case,
thus clarifying the standard that attorneys must follow.
In addition, in Informal Opinion No. 85-1514, the ABA defined
responsibility under Model Rule 1.5(e) so that a referring lawyer
would know exactly what would be expected of him if he received
a forwarding fee.' °4 The ABA defined the assumption of "joint
responsibility for the representation"' 05 as the assumption of re-
sponsibility comparable to that of a partner in a law firm under
similar circumstances, including financial responsibility and ethical
responsibility to the extent a partner would have ethical responsibility
for the actions of other partners in a law firm in accordance with
Rule 5.1. The definition also included the obligation to assure the
adequacy of representation and adequate client communication that
a partner would have for a matter handled by another partner in
the firm under similar circumstances. 1 6
The ABA realized in this opinion that, as a practical matter,
quantifying a division of services would be difficult when an attorney
had performed little or no work. 07 But the safeguard of joint
responsibility for the case was not difficult to quantify. Under Model
Rule 1.5(e) a referring lawyer doing absolutely no work could still
be "responsible" for the case as if he had done the work himself, 08
if he had potential legal liability for everything, including the pos-
sibility of becoming a defendant in a malpractice action when the
performing attorney has been negligent.? 9 Conceivably, such a stand-
ard might prevent the opening of the floodgates that contain the
practice of referral fees that some commentators have feared would
104. See Informal Op. 85-1514, supra note 102.
105. ABA MODEL RULES oF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983).
106. See Informal Op. 85-1514, supra note 102.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Merrick, The Jurisdictional Split on Referral Fees, 3 COMPLEAT LAW VER
18(2), 19 (1986) ("it appears that the assumption of responsibility required for a
division of fees also entails an assumption of liability for the representation afforded
the client"); White, The Referral Fee in Tort: Toward Shared Responsibility, 64
MICH. B.J. 286, 287 (1985) ("should the client sue for malpractice, it would
necessarily mean that the referring attorney stand ready to defend and, possibly,
respond in damages should it be proven that either the receiving or the referring
attorney committed professional negligence").
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result from adoption of the Model Rule. 10 The notion that "re-
sponsibility" may mean "liability" might actually have the desired
effect that was originally intended by the former Canon and the
Code.'
Opponents of the Model Rule argue that even if courts are treating
the Code lightly and allowing referral fees in practice, the idea of
such a fee is still against public policy. Opponents say the rule
focuses more on the interest of the attorney than on the welfare
of the client, and that at least in theory, the Code Rule is an
expression against that practice. 1 2 In response, proponents argue
that in addition to the increased liability lawyers assume under Model
Rule 1.5(e),"13 the Rule still safeguards the client by requiring that:
(1) the client consent to the joint assumption of responsibility by
each attorney; and (2) the total fee must be reasonable." 4
The opinions of both the ABA and state courts illustrate that the
presence or lack of client consent is pivotal in many referral cases:" 5
once it has been ascertained that the client has consented to the
agreement," 6 little or no discussion about services performed is
necessary." 7 Underlying this omission is the inherent conclusion that
the element of consent "goes right to the heart of one of the primary
purposes of the rules regulating attorneys' conduct-assurance of
fair treatment of the client.""' 8 Thus, with the consent of the client
110. As a response to the argument that a lawyer will still be paid for doing
no work, a lawyer who does no work will be liable in a malpractice action. See
Informal Op. 85-1514, supra note 102.
111. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the original
intent behind the Canon and Code Rule.
112. See supra note 12.
113. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
114. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983).
115. See Webb, supra note 4, at 233; sec also Belli v. Shaw, 98 Wash. 2d 569,
657 P.2d 315 (1983) (attorney could not recover fees based on "forwarding fee"
arrangement with another attorney when no evidence showed that client had au-
thorized and consented to such agreement, as required under ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility).
116. "Without exception, clients assent to referrals to expert attorneys, so there
is compliance with the .... rule." Halstrom, supra note 7, at 42; see Kuhn,
Collins, & Rash v. Reynolds, 614 S.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963) (court
determined that because client consented to fee division arrangement, conduct
between two attorneys did not violate any rule, law or public policy).
117. See Webb, supra note 4, at 233; see also Graham v. Safir, 19 A.D.2d 600,
240 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1st Dep't 1963) (court granted payment of forwarding fee based
on client's power to "ratify" such payment although fee not based on division of
services and responsibility).
118. Webb, supra note 4, at 233.
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to the fee arrangement, one can hardly argue that the attorneys are
acting unethically." 9
With regard to the reasonable fee requirement, it has been argued
that even if the rule allowed fee-splitting based on a referral, the
client would still be adversely affected because of an inevitable
increase in the total fee.1 20 The theory underlying this argument is
basically that two lawyers are more costly than one.' To remedy
this problem, the Model Rule provides the safeguard of a standard
for a reasonable fee.122 Thus, even if the other requirements of the
rule are met, in the case of a clearly excessive fee, the division of
fees would be improper. Furthermore, although no one has em-
pirically studied this subject, proponents of this theory have yet to
produce tangible evidence to show that referral fees increase the
cost of legal services. 123 It seems more realistic to assume that fees
charged to the client would be the same irrespective of whether the
lawyer had paid a portion of the fee to his colleague. 24
119. The provision requiring client consent is so important to the ethical issue
of the referral fee that some states have adopted even stiffer notice requirements
than those in the Model Rule. At least two states, California and Illinois, allow
fee splitting in a broader range of situations than do the Model Rules; but both
states have stricter client notice requirements. See The Right Choice, 72 A.B.A.
J. 79 (Oct. 1986).
120. See Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 172 (1929); Palmer v. Breyfogle, 217
Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975); McFarland v. George, 316 S.W.2d 662, 672 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1958).
121. See Richardson, supra note 30, at 194; see also PATTERSON & CHEATHAM,
supra note 96, at 276; Cady, supra note 30, at 236.
122. Model Rule 1.5(a) states:
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
.(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983).
123. See Richardson, supra note 30, at 194-95.
124. Id. (citing J. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND His COMMUNITY 97-98 (1967)).
Clients pay the same or almost the same amount. See Halstrom, supra note 7, at
42.
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Moreover, under Model Rule 1.5(e) fewer attorneys will keep cases
they are unqualified or barely qualified to handle. Because they
will receive some type of compensation, the rule encourages small
practitioners currently unable to refer matters to others without
providing services to refer their clients to more specialized and more
competent attorneys. 25 It has been suggested that under the Model
Rule a referring attorney might have the incentive to refer a case,
not to the most qualified attorney, but instead to that attorney who
would pay the greatest fee. 26 The increased liability associated with
the Model Rule, 27 however, will provide the incentive for attorneys
to refer their clients to the person who will most competently handle
the case.
In addition, only a lawyer who could actually do a better job at
the same or lower cost as the referring attorney has any incentive
to pay for referrals in the first place. 28 The second lawyer would
not be able to offer a satisfactory fee to bid the work away from
the referring attorney unless he could do so. 29 Alternatively, if DR
2-107 were completely abolished and all attorneys could remit a
customary one-third fee to a referring attorney, no lawyer would
be forced to choose between his economic benefit and the welfare
of his client. 30 Moreover, referrals between lawyers in different firms
would accomplish the common custom practiced among lawyers in
the same firm, under which the lawyer who first attracted a client
may refer the client to a colleague with a different specialty but
still "get credit" for fees generated when firm income shares are
allocated. '31
125. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 17. The Model Rule will not only
aid the referring attorney but the specialized attorney as well. A lawyer, however
specialized, is not able to publicize himself as a specialist under the Code. The
referral thus provides a much needed service to the specialist. See Cady, supra
note 30, at 238; see also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-14,
DR 2-105 (1969). "Assistance based on a percentage division efforts encourages
forwarder to retain the expert attorney as soon as possible." Halstrom, supra note
7, at 42; see McKay, In Support Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 VILL.
L. REV. 1137, 1152-53 (1980-81); see also supra note 89.
126. See Aronson, supra note 3, at 65; see also Reilly v. Beekman, 24 F.2d
791, 794 (2d Cir. 1928); Linnick v. State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 17, 21, 396 P.2d 33, 35,
41 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1964) (per curiam); Richardson, supra note 30, at 195.
127. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
128. See McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions.: The Supreme Court's
Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 70 n. 132
(1985) [hereinafter McChesney].
129. See id.
130. See Richardson, supra note 30, at 196.
131. See McChesney, supra note 128, at 70 n.132, The Code expressly approves
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Adoption of Model Rule 1.5(e) is wise not only for the reasons
mentioned above but also for uniformity.1 12 It is in the interest of
not only the national bar but also the legal community as a whole
that rules governing the conduct of lawyers be as consistent as
possible in all jurisdictions.'33 As of the date of this publication,
nineteen states have adopted Model Rule 1.5(e) with little or no
modification. 3 4 In twelve, the rule is pending before state supreme
courts.'35 New York, as a trend setter in the legal profession, 3 6 has
set an example for the rest of the country. As one commentator
has stated:
Members of the New York Bar work with lawyers from all across
the nation. Because New York practice has a national orientation,
New York lawyers have an interest in substantial uniformity of
the rules that govern that practice .... If New York votes to
continue the Code, the prospect is that other states will divide
between the Model Rules and the Code and there will not be
even a semblance of uniformity. New York's leadership can be
highly influential, not only in its adoption of the Model Rules,
but, equally important, in the text of the provisions it adopts.3 7
Thus, New York's lead is yet another reason for advocating adoption
of the Rule by other states.
V. Conclusion
State Bar Associations should favorably consider proposals to
adopt section 1.5(e) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The ABA adopted this rule because DR 2-107 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility was unenforceable, unrealistic, and too
rigid.' This premise is equally true for the legal communities in
of the division of fees with a "partner in or associate of his law firm or law
office." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1969); see In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) ("[blusiness realities of law practice often require that those who bring clients
and capital to a law firm be better compensated than those whose talents lie in
the area of preparing legal papers and arguments").
132. See Kutak, supra note 16, at 1023.
133. See Bar Keeps Issue Open on Adoption of Model Rules, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
4, 1985, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter State Bar]. "Lawyers find the new rule appropriate
and workable." Franck, supra note 101, at .44.
134. See supra note 18.
135. See id.
136. See State Bar, supra note 133, at 6, col. 1.
137. See id.
138. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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the fifty states. Lawyers constantly violate the rule, 39 and courts
have either been unable to enforce it' 4° or have been contradictory
in their theoretical interpretation and practical application of
it.' 41 Model Rule 1.5(e) is stricter than Canon 34, but more flexible
than DR 2-107.142 In essence, the rule provides a happy medium
between the two. 43
No rule is protected from moral and ethical attack when confronted
with the practical effects of its application. The recent support for
Model Rule 1.5(e), however, demonstrates that the policies behind
its adoption have a great deal of validity. It is not suggested that
a bare referral fee paid for no work is proper. Rather, if the courts
apply the rule as suggested in this Note, using the ABA's new
definition of responsibility'" and relying more on the provisions
mandating client consent 45 and reasonable fees, 146 a more practical
approach to referral fees will be effectuated and welcomed by all.
Sheryl Zeligson
139. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 55-91 and accompanying text.
141. See id.
142. See supra notes 45-46, 101-03 and accompanying text.
143 See Kutak, supra note 16, at 1023. The rule is a "reasonable way of
encouraging competent representation while recognizing the realities of practice."
Id.
144. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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